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Since the signing of the regional peace accord in Guatemala City on Aug. 7, 1987, human rights
violations and army actions against civilians have escalated. Highlights of a review of human
rights developments and related developments in Guatemala by the Central American Historical
Institute appear below. (From CAHI Update, 12/28/87. The Institute is an independent research
group, affiliated with the Instituto Historico Centoamericano, Managua, Nicaragua. CAHI can
be contacted at the following address: Intercultural Center, Georgetown University, Washington
DC 10057.) On Human Rights In September 1987 the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States (IACHR) issued a report noting "perceptible decline
in the observance of human rights" in Guatemala since the first months of President Vinicio
Cerezo's administration, and expressing concern over "the resumption of methods and systems
for eliminating persons in mass and the reappearance of the dreadful death squads." Since the
signing of the peace accord, the human rights situation has deteriorated. During a recent visit
in Washington DC, Toribio Pineda, a member of the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission
(CDHG) Executive Committee, told CAHI that "the accords are being used as a smoke screen and
the human rights situation is becoming much graver...In the area of human rights, the accords
have so far served for nothing in Guatemala. If they have served for anything, it has been to allow
violations with much more impunity." Pineda was accompanied by a member of the Commission
for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America (CODEHUCA), based in Costa Rica. In late
November, CODEHUCA delivered a report on human rights in Central America to the United
Nations. Regarding Guatemala, it concluded that "repressive action has continued with the usual
characteristics: the appearance of corpses with clear signs of torture on the roadsides and street; the
abduction and execution of popular leaders, such as in the recent cases of the two attacks on groups
of people in September in a market place and at a bus stop; an increase in arbitrary detentions
which later became forced disappearances; the constant bombing of the civilian population;
fumigations with harmful chemicals, and many other violations which call for the attention of
the international community..." The report documented abuses from August 8 to November 17,
1987. Some 175 individual cases of abductions, disappearances, shootings, and assassinations
are mentioned, in addition to numerous threats, grenades thrown into crowds, and even a bomb
thrown into a church. In some of these cases, the military or security forces' involvement is clear.
For example, a member of the National Police assassinated Rafael Morales Hernandez, a computer
technician, on Sept. 14. In another case, while pursuing unidentified individuals, police threw a
grenade into a crowd at the El Guarda market; two people died and three others were seriously
injured. Amnesty International issued several urgent action alerts on Guatemala in the same period.
One alert discussed the cases of two agricultural activists who were abducted by armed men in
Quetzaltenango in mid-October. Several days later their bodies appeared on highways in the region.
One showed signs of torture; the other had been shot six times and strangled. In December, the
Quetzaltenango police chief and five of his officers were implicated in the crime. The CDHG's
Pineda says that such documented cases represent only a fraction of the abuses that occur, and that
most violations take place outside the capital. The military and government, he says, understand
the role of tourists and other visitors in creating a positive international image for Guatemala if
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the capital appears to be calm, they believe the whole country is the same. "The great majority of
the people living in the capital don't even know what is happening in the countryside," according
to an assistant to Pineda. "In the city, they have been threatening union workers, and people of
the popular movement, but they don't kill the leaders. They don't kill the people who make news.
So then they can appear on television and say that political leaders have not been killed under
the Cerezo government. But the people at the grassroots continue to be killed, and most of the
leaders are being threatened." At the same time, the army launched a major new military campaign
entitled "End of the Year." The most intensive counterinsurgency operation to take place since the
civilian government took office, it included helicopter- transported troops, aerial bombings, and
search and destroy missions in the departments of El Quiche, El Peten, Solola, and San Marcos.
Although heavy fighting occurred, the military's main focus seems to have been disrupting the
civilian population, which it considers the base of support for the insurgency. Indiscriminate
bombings occurred, causing fires, burning many people, and destroying crops and wildlife. In the
Ixil triangle in northern Quiche some 800 people were displaced. According to the Guatemalan
Human Rights Commission/USA, army troops occupied the town of Santiago Atitlan in Solola and
imposed a curfew from 7 pm to 5 am. There were reports of soldiers searching people's homes and
stealing money and food. Military commissioners held town meetings in which the population
was accused of being subversive, and threatened with massacres. The outskirts of the town were
mined, making it impossible for people to work the land. In El Quiche, the army has been forcing
even elderly civilians to serve in the civil patrol, threatening them with torture if they refuse. In
addition, when army troops enter conflictive zones looking for members of the armed opposition,
7-year-old boys are made to walk in front of them so the guerrillas will not attack, according to
information received by the CDHG in August. Pineda believes the psychological damage to the
boys is enormous. Talks with the Guerrillas On Oct. 2, the Cerezo government announced that
representatives of the government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG),
the main insurgent coalition, would meet for the first time in the history of the 20-year-old civil
conflict. A URNG communique issued the same day and confirmed by the government said both
sides also agreed to a temporary cease- fire that was to last through the talks scheduled for Oct. 7-9
in Madrid. These announcements were a surprise to many Guatemalans and foreign observers.
They created hope that a genuine step toward ending the conflict was finally being taken. These
hopes were shortlived. Minister of Defense General Hector Alejandro Gramajo denied that a ceasefire had been arranged, saying, "The army will not respect the unilateral cease-fire announced by
the guerrillas." Gramajo told Spanish newspaper El Pais that the army would support Cerezo's
decision to talk with the insurgents only as long as the result "is the political confirmation of the
military victories that we have had in the course of the counterinsurgency." After three days of
talks, the URNG and the government issued a joint statement making it clear the discussions had
few positive results. It was, however, agreed that an informal communication channel between the
government and the URNG would be established to enable the continuity in exchanging points of
view and to discuss the possibility of future meetings. But the government immediately backed out
of this agreement when the secretary general of the Christian Democratic Party, Alfonso Cabrera,
who is also the foreign minister, said he considered it senseless to hold future meetings, and that the
armed opposition was welcome to incorporate itself into the legal political process. In late October,
Minister of Defense Gramajo stated that "there is no reason to carry out new conversations with
the guerrillas." President Cerezo announced that there will be no more talks until the insurgents
"lay down their weapons and join the democratic process." Cabrera told the Washington Post that
a negotiated cease-fire was not needed in Guatemala because no war exists: "What we have is a
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more and more consolidated democracy." Establishment of National Reconciliation Commission
A month before the talks in Madrid, a National Reconciliation Commission was established, in
accordance with the peace accord. Members include Vice-President Carpio; Tere Bolanos Zarco,
a conservative journalist and owner of one of Guatemala's largest newspapers; Jorge Serrano
Elias, a right-wing political leader; and Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruno. The Commission played
no role in arranging the talks with the URNG, nor did it attend. Although the Commission met
after the talks in Madrid to hear the government's report, no statement was issued. In fact, the
Commission has made no public pronouncements since it was formed, and it appears to have
no defined role. Amnesty On Nov. 4, a new amnesty went into effect in Guatemala, just in time
for President Cerezo to announce on Nov. 5 (the first of a series of deadlines for compliance) that
his government was fulfilling the accord's requirements. The new law, unlike previously enacted
amnesties which benefitted the military, refers specifically to those who have committed "crimes
against the political order of the state." Such wording won the praise of those who feared that the
government would use the amnesty provision of the accord to exonerate members of the army
and security forces who had committed human rights abuses since Cerezo took office. This is the
most substantial step the government has taken to comply with the accord, but just who the law
will benefit remains uncertain. One provision of the amnesty will have very few beneficiaries since
it was written exclusively for political prisoners. Unlike the other Central American countries,
Guatemala's prisons hold almost no political prisoners. Those considered by the army to be enemies
of the state have been assassinated or disappeared. The other provision is extended to those who
have taken up arms against the government. Such individuals have 180 days to give themselves
up and turn in their weapons, ammunition, and war materiel. But there is some evidence that the
army may be manipulating the law by calling all refugees or internally displaced persons trying
to return to their homelands "repentant subversives." According to the Central America Report,
as of Nov. 19, only one family of Kakchiquel Indians from Tecpan had turned itself in, admitting
collaboration with the insurgency. But on Dec. 10, Defense Minister Gramajo was quoted as saying
that 1,867 people had accepted amnesty in northern Guatemala alone, an area where the army has
been particularly active in its counterinsurgency program. Government and military estimates
place the entire insurgent movement at about 1,000 people; the highest figures, put out by the
URNG, are about 3,500. Since heavy fighting continues in several areas of the country, it can be
assumed that the majority of those Gramajo referred to were not armed rebels. They may be
guerrilla collaborators. But at a time when human rights violations are increasing and a new military
campaign aimed at "subversive" civilians is underway, it seems unlikely that so many would
voluntarily put their fate in military hands. A more plausible scenario is that the army has revived
a practice of the recent past requiring refugees requesting repatriation or internally displaced
individuals who have been forced out of hiding to sign a paper saying they accept amnesty, whether
or not they admit supporting the armed opposition. Public relations value of accord compliance
The steps the Christian Democratic government has taken with regard to the peace accord, with
minimal impact thus far inside the country, have had great public relations value internationally.
Coupled with Cerezo's outspoken support of the peace plan, and his willingness to oppose Reagan
administration policy in Central America, they have worked to create a new, much more favorable
image for Guatemala abroad. Since Cerezo took office in 1986, the government has been lobbying
to have Guatemala removed from the United Nations list of countries in which human rights
must be monitored. Two general blocs have formed since then within the UN General Assembly
commission that deals with such issues: those who support the Cerezo position and want Guatemala
removed from the list, and those who want international observation of Guatemala's human rights
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performance to continue. To the present, the latter group has also actively sponsored and promoted
resolutions condemning the continuing human rights abuse since the Christian Democrats took
formal control of the Guatemalan government. The second group has always been strong enough
to ensure some international attention was focused on their concerns. Since the signing of the
peace accord, however, this situation has changed, according to the CDHG and CODEHUCA.
Those urging an end to UN monitoring, including most Latin American countries, especially the
Contadora group, argue that the potential success of the peace accord might be jeopardized by
emphasizing human rights issues, and that Cerezo is already doing his best to improve human
rights. The other bloc, while acknowledging that human rights violations continue and may even
have increased, no longer introduces resolutions of condemnation because it lacks the votes to have
them pass. Although it does not want international observation of Guatemala terminated, it accepts
the idea that the peace accord must take precedence over other concerns, including human rights.
During the UN General Assembly meetings in New York last fall, a compromise was made that
Guatemala would not be discussed this year. This meant that Guatemala would remain on the list of
countries needing to be observed, but no resolutions of condemnation were introduced. According
to Pineda, "The [international community] needs to understand that you can't separate political
efforts and human rights. They are trying to put political matters on one side and human rights on
the other. For example, take the human rights work carried out during the military governments
in Guatemala. The work done at the human rights level and the condemnations of human rights
violations made by the United Nations General Assembly had political implications. In 1986, the
government of Guatemala publicly recognized that thanks to the UN and the concern for human
rights in Guatemala it had maintained previously, a civilian government was able to come to power,
creating the opportunity to start a new process. Human rights played an important role in the
political sphere, at least in opening the possibility for a change in the human rights situation."
Pineda continues, "It is important to look at this same thing in the present moment. The role
the UN plays is going to have political ramifications, including giving real potential to the peace
processes started by the accord. If the UN takes away the international observation of human rights
in Guatemala, the political problem in Guatemala is going to get much more complicated, which can
affect the whole region...Peace in Central America is not going to appear in the sky or be obtained
simply by the signing of an accord, but will depend on whether or not respect for human rights
is being promoted inside each country." President Cerezo and human rights One argument used
by those who favor diminishing the focus on Guatemala's internal affairs has been that President
Cerezo is gaining more power within the country, and thus greater ability to deal with human
rights violations. His support for the peace accord internationally, they claim, is strengthening his
hand at home. The government has made a few gestures which support this claim. Nineteen police
officers were charged with committing violent crimes in 1987, including the six recently implicated
in the murders of the two agricultural activists. But CODEHUCA and CDHG question whether
Cerezo is serious about curbing human rights abuses. They mention an incident which occurred
last October when advertisements in the press were expressing concern about the frightening
increase in abuses and the Human Rights Commission of the Guatemalan Congress decided it
had to act. The members planned to talk with the Minister of Defense to see if a solution to the
problem could be worked out. Instead of encouraging such action, President Cerezo forbade them
to do so, saying they should leave the initiative to him since he is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic. They did, and the initiative died. According to Pineda's assistant, another indication of
Cerezo's lack of interest in improving the situation is his behavior effort to remove Guatemala from
the United Nations human rights agenda: "If he really wanted to stop the army or investigate cases
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of abuse which have occurred during his government, the most logical thing would be to ask the
international community to continue paying attention to the case of Guatemala, that it stay on the
UN agenda. But the government is doing the opposite. It is the only help the UN can give, and the
government is trying to get rid of it." In addition, the IACHR 1986-1987 annual report expressed
concern over the government's "apparent unwillingness to cooperate with the Commission in
determining the facts" of new cases of abuse, and over "the preponderant role still played by the
armed forces, which are not subject to effective government control." Even if Cerezo is genuinely
interested in improving the human rights climate in the country, and peacefully resolving the civil
conflict, the army has made it clear it is not interested. In October, Minister of Defense Gramajo
told Guatemala's El Grafico newspaper that the army will not consider the fight over until every
"enemy in the country" is eliminated. Pineda said this attitude causes great concern, since the
military has always considered the civilian population in conflictive zones as a "possible, potential,
or actual" base of insurgency, and thus enemies of the country. On Nov. 6, Cerezo announced
that the "president, vice-president, and foreign minister have each complied with their duties to
continue and strengthen the commitment process outlined by the five presidents in Esquipulas II."
But Pineda and the other members of the CDHG and CODEHUCA believe that if nothing is done
to stop the human rights violations, and the quality of life does not improve, the peace accord will
fail: "We can't talk about a reconciliation where we all embrace each other and simply forget about
the problems, where we forget about the disappeared...We believe that the only true reconciliation
is one that focuses on economic, social, and human rights, that ensures the minimum conditions for
survival. Only on such a basis can reconciliation be achieved. If they don't adopt any measures to
obtain this, what kind of reconciliation can they offer?"

-- End --
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